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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
     PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                 V.
                                               17 CV 0124 (LLS)
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                                               Telephone Conference
      QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING
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      COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,
                     Defendants.
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                                               New York, N.Y.
10
                                                December 14, 2020
                                                2:03 p.m.
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      Before:
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                           HON. LOUIS L. STANTON,
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                                               District Judge
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                       APPEARANCES VIA TELECONFERENCE
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      FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
           Attorneys for Plaintiff FTC
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      BY: ANNETTE SOBERATS
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           MICHELLE K. RUSK
     NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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           Attorneys for Plaintiff State of New York
     BY: KATHRYN A. MATUSCHAK
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     KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
           Attorneys for Defendants
21
     BY: GEOFFREY W. CASTELLO, III
                  AND
22
      COZEN O'CONNOR
           Attorneys for Defendants
     BY: MICHAEL B. deLEEUW
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1 (The Court and all parties appearing telephonically) THE COURT: Good afternoon. 2 3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Good afternoon. 4 THE COURT: I hear two male voices and one female, and 5 so I can figure out the first one is Ms. Soberats and/or 6 Ms. Matuschak. I think you better state your name when you're 7 speaking, which also will be clearer for the record. I have just read Quincy's December 10 letter 8 9 responding to the FTC. Maybe the FTC should go first. I must 10 say, I thought his letter was quite clear, the FTC's letter, 11 but why doesn't the FTC say whatever it wants to say orally and 12 then we can have Quincy reply? 13 MS. SOBERATS: Yes, your Honor. This is Annette 14 Soberats speaking on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission. 15 Your Honor, the defendants have communicated to the FTC that they would like to proceed with the rule 30(b)(6) 16 17 deposition of our agency --THE COURT: Look, Ms. Soberats --18 19 MS. SOBERATS: Yes. 20 THE COURT: -- I've read the correspondence. 21 MS. SOBERATS: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Don't tell me background stuff that we all 23 know. 24 MS. SOBERATS: Correct. Well, as I stated in our 25 letter, we believe that the Court's order was very clear that

it was barring the 30(b)(6) deposition of both agencies, and in that order, the Court did not direct the FTC to produce a witness on any topic.

It's our understanding that defendants would like clarification of the order, but we believe the Court's order was very clear and that the Court agreed with us that --

THE COURT: Ms. Soberats.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes?

THE COURT: Ms. Soberats, if you're just repeating what you said in the letter, then I feel responsible to answer. I do not think the order was perfectly clear, I'm sorry to say. But the defendant is correct in its interpretation that I was only dealing with the matters before me, which is my usual practice, I think most courts' usual practice.

And so the topics which I did not rule on, the remaining ones that I did not regard as being at issue, are open for the deposition. That's the good news for Quincy.

The good news for the government and for the witness is that in allowing those questions to go forward, I am laying great stress on the word "topics." In other words, in the identification of the topics and the discussion of it in the letters, no precise questions were put and no factual matters were discussed and, therefore, why I am letting the questioning on those topics go forward is simply because it is possible that there may be something interesting to this case that falls

under those topics and that could be explored by questioning.

The range of topics is very, very broad, but that does not mean that the range of the questioning will be very, very broad. The issues in this case are quite finite. What would be allowed in evidence respecting them is quite apparent to any trial lawyer, and it's not going to include the vast amount of material which might be, in an uncontrolled deposition, allowed to be sought. That is not the procedure that's to be followed.

I am merely deferring to the questioning process the responsibility of counsel to confine his questions or her questions to those that have something to do with this case, and a whole lot of discussion with other people and other cases under other circumstances regarding other topics is not part of that inquiry.

So that is really the framework of our discussion.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes, your Honor. This is Annette Soberats from the Federal Trade Commission.

And I would just like to clarify that, based on the order, there were certain topics that the Court did prohibit for the FTC. So the Court is referring to those topics that remain? That's my understanding.

THE COURT: Exactly. I should have started by saying that I'm embarrassed that the first sentence of the second full paragraph on page 4 said: "Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for a protective order barring the rule 30(b)(6) depositions of the

NYAG and the FTC is granted." I think, technically, that may fairly be read to mean there won't be any depositions. That is not the intention of that order.

The intention of the order is that the protective order is granted with respect to those items that were being discussed, and on the others, it simply made no ruling at all. And now the time to go forward with the depositions has come. I am forecasting to counsel, in fairness, what the rules respecting that deposition will be, and I'm sorry to have written something that sent you off on these wild hunts.

Now, while I have the floor, I'll deal with another point that was raised and the ruling, of course, is that any ruling that applies to one plaintiff, also applies to the other. I think the government had some doubt about that but, of course, they get the benefit and the non-benefit of whatever the ruling on the same point made as to their partner in the case applies to them.

Now, where does that leave us this afternoon?

MS. SOBERATS: Your Honor, this is Annette Soberats for the FTC.

Thank you for your clarification of the order. We understand the Court's ruling, and we will proceed with conferring with counsel on a date for 30(b)(6) depositions for the FTC on the topics that the Court did not rule upon.

THE COURT: Thank you. And I must say, from your

letters, it looks as though the FTC has been pretty forthcoming on this.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I say that simply following the representations of counsel. I haven't seen any of the underlying data, as you know.

MS. SOBERATS: Your Honor, this status conference was originally calendared for the purpose of setting an expert discovery schedule, and I wanted to let the Court know that the parties have met and conferred and agreed on deadlines for initial expert reports, rebuttal reports and expert depositions.

THE COURT: Oh, yes, yes. Those have to be expanded to allow the work to be done.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me ask you -- who am I talking to?

MS. SOBERATS: This is Annette Soberats from the Federal Trade Commission.

THE COURT: I'm curious, if we're shifting ground, I have a question to put to the lawyers for Quincy, but I'll withhold it. And from your voice, I suspect that I'm still talking to the government lawyers. Is there anything further that you wish to present?

MS. SOBERATS: Your Honor, on behalf of the FTC, I just wanted to let the Court know what the parties have decided

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on the expert discovery schedule, but there is another --1 2 THE COURT: Oh, you can do that in writing. 3 MS. SOBERATS: Yes, we will. 4 THE COURT: Whatever you work out, I'm going to 5 approve. 6 MS. SOBERATS: Okay. 7 THE COURT: You're the ones that have to do the work, not I. And it's much better for me to let -- you're 8 9 experienced, responsible counsel. I'm not going to second 10 quess you. 11 MS. SOBERATS: Yes. And on behalf of plaintiffs, 12 there is another dispute concerning fact discovery that we 13 wanted to bring to the Court's attention. We have been trying 14 to obtain intelligible dissemination information for the TBN radio advertisements that contain the challenged claim. 15 is information that is critical to our ability to prepare for 16 17 trial and to provide defendants with a sample of the ads that 18 we are challenging, which the Court also ordered us to do. 19 THE COURT: What is the information you want? 20 MS. SOBERATS: We would like to know when specific TV 21 and radio ads ran and where. 22 THE COURT: Oh. MS. SOBERATS: Yes, that's information that we need, 23

your Honor, to produce a fair representation of the ads that we

25 are challenging, as this Court ordered us to do on

December 3rd.

THE COURT: Is that the only way you can get it?

3 MS. SOBERATS: We have tried to obtain that

information from the defendants, and they provided us with a list that contains titles for ads that we cannot recognize, and we've been trying to work with them. We went back and we identified the ads that we believe they're referring to, and we simply asked them to confirm, yes or no, that we were matching up those ads to the proper Bates numbers in their production.

And the defendants informed us on Friday that they will not provide us with that simple "yes" or "no" confirmation, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why not?

MS. SOBERATS: They believe they are under no obligation to do that.

THE COURT: Let them speak for themselves.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes.

MR. CASTELLO: Your Honor, this is Castello for the corporate defendants.

I don't think the story is as simple as it's being conveyed to your Honor this afternoon. We have gone back and forth on this issue for months and months. It is our position that we've provided all of the information regarding the dissemination of advertisements and marketing pieces that we've produced.

And we apparently have a disagreement, but I would say, your Honor, I absolutely do not agree that we haven't produced the data or have refused to give it. And I would suggest that there might be a better way of going about this because if your Honor will recall, the defendants took issue with the fact that the FTC and the NYAG would not identify the specific advertisements that they were challenging in this action. And your Honor has required, through the order, both of those agencies to provide us, the defendants, with a sample of those ads.

And so we're now being asked to do exactly what the FTC said it wouldn't do, and I suggest that maybe a better way to go about it is for the FTC and NYAG to put together their sample of representative ads and give them to us, to the defendants. And we will go and try to determine what dissemination information exists for them that we have not already provided.

THE COURT: It seems to me much more practical that if they want to identify what a specific ad is that they ask you, that you should say "yes" or "no." That allows them a freer and more accurate hand in preparing their sample.

While we're talking, what information of value to

Quincy -- not in the abstract, but for use at trial -- are you
seeking with respect to all of these wide collateral topics of
what they did in other cases, what individual employees may

have seen or said or written or perceived? What are the jury points that you are seeking?

MR. CASTELLO: With respect to the other cases, your Honor, that we've sought information on, specifically with respect to other manufacturers and advertisers of brain health supplements, we would like to know what it was that the FTC did with those other investigations and actions to determine whether or not the treatment here is disparate compared to those other cases because I believe —

THE COURT: Why is that relevant or interesting?

MR. CASTELLO: Well, your Honor, I think it's relevant because it helps us determine why we are the target of this lawsuit when other manufacturers and advertisers of brain health supplements might not be.

Your Honor, the other reason for the depositions, and if your Honor has narrowed it earlier, I understand what your Honor has said, and we will abide by your Honor's direction.

But there is no difference between these agencies and any other civil litigant in federal district court. And part of the issue with depositions is you learn at the deposition things that you did not know before, and if you are foreclosed from taking that deposition, you'll never have the opportunity to even pursue questions and topics for investigation that might be relevant.

And so, I am not looking to take a deposition of

either one of these agencies just for the purpose of taking a deposition. I'd like to learn what I don't already know from a litigant, a civil litigant in an action in the same manner in which both of those agencies took the deposition of the defendants.

THE COURT: But there is no general underlying rule that the agency must do in one case, on the facts as perceived in that case, in the same way in this case with the facts as perceived by them in this case. There's simply no parallel, and I'm trying to speculate on something along that line that I would allow you to argue to a jury, and I simply haven't found it yet and I'm not hearing it.

MR. CASTELLO: Well, your Honor, I don't know what information either one of these agencies may have in their possession that I would consider to be --

THE COURT: I'm allowing you to seek it for that reason. I don't know either. But in taking that deposition, I want you to be aware you're on very thin ice because I think the whole search is off the point of the issues that we're going to be trying in this case, which is FTC against Quincy, not FTC against anybody else.

MR. CASTELLO: I appreciate that, your Honor, but if I may just to continue. For instance, if FTC has considered evidence from another manufacturer that one of -- and for that reason did not pursue either an action or came to some other

determination through the use of that material that was produced by that defendant, and I thought that that was something that I wanted to share with my expert to determine whether we're talking about apples to oranges or apples to apples, that's the type of information I'd be interested in.

I'd also be interested in learning what type of exculpatory information or evidence these agencies may possess because I believe that's directly relevant to their claims in this action. We have a fundamental disagreement about science here, and I would like to be able to visit with our experts what we learn at these depositions.

There might not be anything of value there, your Honor, and we certainly wouldn't argue to a jury extraneous or irrelevant material. I just don't know right now what I don't know.

THE COURT: Of what interest is it in this case that there's an inconsistency between the way the FTC is approaching this one and the way it approached some other one?

MR. CASTELLO: If in another case, your Honor, the defendant came forward with scientific substantiation for its claims that my expert believed is exactly the type of scientific substantiation that Quincy has provided, I'd like to be able to argue to a jury that the arbitrary decision by an agency to pursue one defendant or one manufacturer over another when they have the same level of substantiation is relevant, it

means something. And it should mean something to a juror what those apples and apples are and how that fits in in the context of this action.

 $\mbox{MS. SOBERATS:}$  Your Honor, this is Annette Soberats from the FTC --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Hold on a moment.

I would think that if the evidence, the scientific view on the facts was on facts that were very much the same as the issues in this case, that that might give you a ground to argue that they were right in that case and are wrong in this case. And that might make an argument that you could make to the jury, and it's for considerations like that that I'm allowing you to go forward delicately, narrowly and factually along that line, to see if anything like that turns up.

I think that's within your legitimate trial preparation. But I have no faith in the argument that the mere inconsistency shows some bias or antipathy outside of the facts on the part of the government agency. But I'm letting you go forward to develop, if you can, just that kind of argument.

MR. CASTELLO: Thank you. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I would expect that the source for it would have been found in the scientific community, rather than in the legal community, but I am hopelessly naive in these matters.

Ms. Soberats, I think I cut you off.

MS. SOBERATS: Yes. Your Honor, thank you for allowing me to respond. I just wanted to clarify that the FTC has responded in writing to defendants' interrogatory asking us to identify, for the past ten years, other actions that we have brought against dietary supplement companies that have marketed products for memory or improved cognition. And one of the outstanding requests that they have is to question us on identifying every FTC employee who has ever communicated --

THE COURT: I'm not going to entertain that kind of question. It falls by its own weight. There's not a judge sitting in this court who wouldn't say that isn't too broad and, of course, it's vacated as too broad.

MS. SOBERATS: Thank you, your Honor. I also would like to clarify, there have been multiple references to a jury trial. It is plaintiff's view that this is a case in equity and that, on that basis, it should proceed as a bench trial, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I understood what you were saying. I'm actually sure I didn't understand what you were saying.

MS. SOBERATS: Oh, I'm sorry. I'll try to be clearer. There have been several references during this status conference to a jury, and it is plaintiff's view that the trial should be a bench trial.

THE COURT: Oh, but are you seeking only injunctive

relief?

MS. SOBERATS: We are seeking injunctive relief and ancillary equitable monetary relief.

THE COURT: What's the equitable extra relief?

MS. SOBERATS: We are seeking redress in the form of consumer refunds, and if that is not feasible, your Honor, we would be seeking disgorgement.

THE COURT: Well, you see, there you're edging, I think, out of equity. I understand, I do, that it's a descendent of equity, but when you get down to dollars and cents and the payment from one to another, you're pretty close to a law situation. That's why I've been considering it as a jury trial throughout. I do recognize, of course, that the main relief is the injunction, but the damages in these cases is a non-trivial.

MS. SOBERATS: And, your Honor, courts have routinely rejected jury demands in FTC cases, and we believe that the law in the Second Circuit is clear that the type of relief we're seeking is equitable in nature.

And we also believe that the defendants have waived their right to a jury trial. They filed their answer over a year ago, and they did not raise a jury trial in their answer or 14 days later, as would have been required under rule 38.

But regardless, your Honor, we think that the law is very clear in the Second Circuit that the type of relief that

plaintiffs are seeking is equitable in nature and, therefore, this case should proceed as a bench trial.

THE COURT: What do you think about that, Mr. Castello?

MR. CASTELLO: Yes, your Honor. Castello for the corporate defendants.

A couple of issues there, your Honor. We have, and I believe your Honor in the order that was issued on -- I'm sorry, I'm just going to grab the date here; it's document 148 -- on December 3rd did reference a jury trial.

In our case management order and at the conference, your Honor, we did raise the issue of a jury trial. And I would also note that NYAG is seeking relief under the GBL and has demanded a relief in the form of civil penalties, and that is not an equitable matter, your Honor.

And I would disagree with Ms. Soberats' and the FTC's position that disgorgement or restitution are strictly equitable. I believe that, as your Honor mentioned, it teeters on the edge of law and equity. And with the amount of money at issue here, I believe that it is a proper issue to put before a juror.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, this is Kate Matuschak for the Attorney General, if I could be permitted to respond?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Thank you, your Honor. We agree with

the FTC's position that it's quite clear that there's been a waiver of the jury trial demand here.

In addition, yes, we are also seeking restitution and disgorgement, both of which sound in equity, and this case is also seeking injunctive relief; so this case is really equitable in nature.

It is true that we are also seeking penalties under GBL section 350(d), but that portion of the relief we were seeking is ancillary to this action, which really does sound in equity.

So if the Court is inclined to disagree on that, we would respectfully request the opportunity to brief the Court so that we could show the Court the case law that we have that supports our position that this case is not one in which the defendants are entitled to a jury trial.

I'm certainly not going to rule this afternoon from the hip. I do think you should brief it, and we should all have a chance to think about it. Frankly, I've simply formed the impression that I described to you earlier, that it was a jury case, but if it's really an issue, it's an issue that's important and should be briefed briefly and thoughtfully and to the point and decided promptly. You're free to do that.

The defendant says they already made a jury demand at a conference, and I think you have to take that seriously in

your waiver argument. But I don't remember the date of the conference or the relationship to the pleading under rule 30(a), but it's an important point and I would want to think about it.

It makes a big difference to the trial and may make a difference to the outcome because the jury doesn't have to explain their reasoning. My mind has been a great deal opened on it by what the FTC has said, but as you know, and is in almost every court a kind of a bias towards a jury and if there's any really serious reasons supporting it. And on that, I'm drawing a blank because this is the first time I've heard it.

MS. MATUSCHAK: This is Kate Matuschak from the
New York Attorney General again. Thank you, your Honor. I
really appreciate your willingness to consider the issue, and
we would be happy to brief it for the Court.

THE COURT: Is there anything else we should deal with now?

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, this is Kate Matuschak again from the New York Attorney General's Office.

I just wanted to flag for the Court that we may or may not be coming to the Court with respect to an issue of fact discovery because defendants have not given us a definitive answer on whether they will give us discovery essential for us to determine our financial relief that we would request.

Defendants have taken the position that discovery necessary for our financial relief is not relevant until liability is determined. They have committed to giving us their financial statements after liability is determined in this case because their sales and advertising are continuing, and so the restitution and disgorgement and penalty amounts are accumulating.

But in addition to some financial statements, we've also requested an updated response to the written discovery requests related to penalties and to disgorgement, and we have not yet received a response as to whether defendants will do that. So we may be coming to the Court for relief on that in coming weeks.

MR. CASTELLO: Your Honor, if I may? This is

Castello. I think that was a pitch, perhaps, for a jury trial,

but I'll leave that for your Honor's eye for another day. But

what I did want to say, once again, we have a disagreement over

the amount of discovery, I suppose, or the up-to-date nature of

the discovery.

We have already provided voluminous financial data regarding sales sold, and I would note that it was the NYAG that also proposed holding in abeyance further production of financial information pending a determination on liability, which I think makes good sense.

THE COURT: Are you talking about bifurcating this

case?

MS. MATUSCHAK: No, your Honor. I think the NYAG -THE COURT: No, I'm asking Mr. Castello. He wants to
withhold financial information pending a determination of
liability, I thought he said.

MR. CASTELLO: And that was a proposal that the NYAG had entertained, and all I said, your Honor, was I believe that, at this point, they have all of the financial information up to a date certain. We have not withheld it.

What we are withholding is the continuous back-and-forth production of financial information as that data continues to develop month after month.

So it's just going to be numbers that will change, your Honor. The substance won't. Just the numbers will, and that information is not relevant at this stage. There's nothing in the case or at trial that would require that information now.

THE COURT: Well, the bringing of the case does not entitle the FTC to a continuing audit of the defendants' earnings or conduct of its business. So maybe a suspense in that and then an updating of it, to the extent needed, just before trial might serve everybody's purposes.

I must say that, on the whole, and putting aside the flotilla of arguments presented on every point by both sides, that on the whole, the production in this case has been very

reasonable. And after a lot of huffing and puffing, there is a grownup disclosure of the things the other side needs and should have.

And I really urge you to continue in that way. It's the way trial lawyers should act. The case has to be, in the end, tried on the whole. The relevant things have to emerge and be heard. The lawyers are supposed to facilitate that and not encumber it with a whole lot of petty arguments or hopeful detours. And I think, on the whole, you've come around in each case to a rather reasonable outcome. So I urge you to continue that, and I'll try to write clearer orders.

MR. CASTELLO: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. SOBERATS: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks very much. Bye now.

(Adjourned)